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Background: The burden of chronic conditions is on the rise in India, necessitating long-term support from
healthcare services. Healthcare, in India, is primarily financed through out-of-pocket payments by households.
Considering scarce evidence available from India, our study investigates whether and how out-of-pocket payments
for outpatient care affect individuals with chronic conditions.
Methods: A large census covering 9299 households was conducted in Bangalore, India. Of these, 3202 households
that reported presence of chronic condition were further analysed. Data was collected using a structured
household-level questionnaire. Out-of-pocket payments, catastrophic healthcare expenditure, and the resultant
impoverishment were measured using a standard technique.
Results: The response rate for the census was 98.5%. Overall, 69.6% (95%CI=68.0-71.2) of households made
out-of-pocket payments for outpatient care spending a median of 3.2% (95%CI=3.0-3.4) of their total income.
Overall, 16% (95%CI=14.8-17.3) of households suffered financial catastrophe by spending more than 10% of
household income on outpatient care. Occurrence and intensity of financial catastrophe were inequitably high
among poor. Low household income, use of referral hospitals as place for consultation, and small household size
were associated with a greater likelihood of incurring financial catastrophe.
The out-of-pocket spending on chronic conditions doubled the number of people living below the poverty line in
one month, with further deepening of their poverty. In order to cope, households borrowed money (4.2%
instances), and sold or mortgaged their assets (0.4% instances).
Conclusions: This study provides evidence from India that the out-of-pocket payment for chronic conditions, even
for outpatient care, pushes people into poverty. Our findings suggest that improving availability of affordable
medications and diagnostics for chronic conditions, as well as strengthening the gate keeping function of the
primary care services are important measures to enhance financial protection for urban poor. Our findings call for
inclusion of outpatient care for chronic conditions in existing government-initiated health insurance schemes.
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With an epidemiological transition underway in India,
the burden of chronic and non-communicable diseases
is on the rise. In 2005, these conditions were responsible
for 53% of all deaths, and their proportional impact is
expected to increase to 67% in 2020 [1]. Chronic condi-
tions, which include most non-communicable diseases
but also some communicable diseases, require continu-
ous medical care complemented by long-term support
from healthcare services. Responding to the care
demands of people with chronic conditions is a chal-
lenge in most low- and middle-income countries, includ-
ing India, where the health system is weak and remains
primarily oriented towards the management of infectious
diseases, and maternal and child healthcare [1-3]. Health
system strengthening is increasingly advocated as a cen-
tral strategy in the endeavour to improve care for
chronic conditions in these countries [2,4].
Health financing is one of the building blocks of health
systems [5,6]. Health systems, ideally, should be financed
in a way that people can use healthcare services without
financial hardship [5]. In India, 71.1% of healthcare is
financed through out-of-pocket (OOP) payments by
households at the time and point of healthcare use [7].
In 2004–2005, 64.4% of households in India had to incur
OOP payments for healthcare [8]. OOP payments act as
the primary barrier to access healthcare services in India,
and lead to significant impoverishment among those
who use the services [8,9]. In fact, Berman and collea-
gues [10] reported that in 2004, approximately 6.2% of
Indians fell below the poverty line due to OOP payments
for healthcare; a greater proportion of them for out-
patient care (4.9%) than for inpatient care (1.3%), while
expenditure for medications constituted the greatest
share (71.2%). We hypothesise that people with chronic
conditions are likely to incur higher OOP payments for
outpatient care, as they need periodic outpatient visits
and regular medication on a long-term basis. Such pay-
ments may impoverish them and even push them below
the poverty line.
Despite several recent studies examining OOP pay-
ments for healthcare in India, very few of them report
findings disaggregated by type of care (outpatient/in-
patient), location (urban/rural) and type of ailments
(acute/chronic). Only one study from West Bengal
reported some findings on OOP payments for chronic
disease care, and its impact on households [11,12]. This
study showed that households spent 4.1% of their annual
expenditure on chronic disease care. It also indicated
that the OOP payments for outpatient care were more
strongly associated with financial catastrophe than those
for inpatient care.
The purpose of this study is to contribute to this
knowledge gap by investigating whether and how OOPpayments for outpatient care affect individuals with
chronic conditions in Kadugondanahalli (KG Halli), a
poor urban neighbourhood in South India.
Context
KG Halli, a site of this study, is one of the 198 administra-
tive units of Bangalore city, a metropolitan capital of
Karnataka. KG Halli has a population of more than 44,500
individuals spread over 0.7 square kilometre [13]. KG Halli
includes an area classified as a slum, and the median in-
come of KG Halli residents is INR 73.3 (USD 1.5) per
capita per day [13]. A ‘slum’ is a compact settlement of
poorly built tenements with inadequate sanitary and
drinking water facilities [14]. The population in KG Halli
is a social mix, with people speaking five different lan-
guages and representing all major religions of the country.
KG Halli also has pluralistic healthcare services.
Government provides care through an urban health
centre and a community health centre, run by the muni-
cipal and provincial governments, respectively. These fa-
cilities provide outpatient care and outreach services
using allopathic (or ‘modern’) medicine. These health
centres provide free care to people living below the pov-
erty line, whereas other users need to pay nominal user
fees for some of the services. Additionally, there are at
least 32 private healthcare providers (excluding dentists
and paramedics) from various systems of medicine (pri-
marily Unani, Ayurveda, Allopathy and Homeopathy)
[13]. Private healthcare provision is through several
single-doctor clinics and four private hospitals. All of the
private facilities provide outpatient care, but only the
hospitals provide inpatient facilities, with their capacity
ranging from 50 to 100 beds. There are several private
pharmacies and laboratories in KG Halli. Private sec-
tor is largely unregulated and works on fee-for-service
basis [13].
KG Halli is the field site for the Urban Health Action
Research Project (UHARP) of the Institute of Public
Health (IPH), Bangalore, since 2009 [15]. KG Halli was
purposefully selected for the UHARP to study how ac-
cess to quality healthcare could be improved in a poor
urban community with a pluralistic healthcare system.
The residents as well as healthcare providers in KG Halli
have identified difficulties in affording healthcare as one
of the major issues in the area.
The specific objectives of the present study were
therefore to assess the i) incidence and extent of the
OOP payments on outpatient care for chronic condi-
tions; ii) incidence of the financial catastrophe due to
OOP payments; and iii) resultant impoverishment
among residents of KG Halli. The result of this study
would feed into UHARP and serve as an avenue for dis-
cussion and action by stakeholders in the area to im-
prove affordability of chronic condition care.
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Study design
We report findings from a large cross-sectional study
(census) conducted between June 2009 and March 2010
covering all of the households in KG Halli. Of the 9299
households covered in the census, we further analysed
data of 3202 households that reported having one or
more members with a chronic condition.
Data collection and management
We collected data using a structured household-level
questionnaire with close-ended questions about socio-
demographic characteristics, self-reported illness profile,
healthcare seeking behaviour, and healthcare expend-
iture. The questionnaire was developed in English and
translated into Kannada, a regional language commonly
spoken in KG Halli.
The questionnaire was field tested and refined.
Trained data collectors, who were from a similar socioe-
conomic background to that of the respondents and
were fluent in regional languages, administered the
questionnaire. Given that most earning members in the
households go out for work for most of the day, the only
eligibility criterion we employed for choosing the re-
spondent was to have any family member present aged
18 years or older. The flowchart in Figure 1 reveals strat-
egies employed to improve the response rate and the
households included at various stages of the census.
All the completed questionnaires were examined
for internal validation. Data were externally validated
by randomly selecting one in twenty completed ques-
tionnaires and revisiting the household to confirm
responses. Trained data entry operators entered the data
using EpiData Entry 3.1 (The EpiData Association,
Odense Denmark).Figure 1 Sample constitution. This figure depicts the number of househ
strategies used to enhance the response rate, this figure explains how theEthics considerations
At the time of this study, the Institute of Public Health,
Bangalore did not have Institutional Ethics Committee,
and a policy requiring a formal ethics approval for non-
clinical survey research. However, we followed ethical
principles set for such research.
Considering the low literacy level, linguistic pluralism,
and perceived worries/reservations around signing docu-
ments among sample population, we preferred to seek
informed verbal consent from participants. The partici-
pants were explained, in the language that they were
confortable with, the purpose of the study, voluntary
and anonymous nature of participation in the study,
including their rights to withdraw participation at any
stage during questionnaire administration. Outcome of
the consent process was recorded (as refusal or agree-
ment) in the questionnaire. Data on refusal by partici-
pants was maintained (Figure 1). Confidentiality of
participants and their family members was assured. Data
privacy was maintained: physical forms were stored in a
locked metal container at the Institute of Public Health,
whereas electronic data were stored in a secured folder
in computers of first and second authors. Only research-
ers of UHARP had access to the data, only for the re-
search purpose.
Measures and analyses
The dependent variables used in this study are described
below.
OOP payments for healthcare
We measured OOP payment as the sum of all healthcare
related expenditures made by individuals/households
within 30 days preceding the census at the time when
healthcare services were received [16]. We collected dataolds included in the survey at various stages. Apart from the specific
response rate (98.5%) to the survey was calculated.
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ation fees, facility charges, expenses for medications and
laboratory investigations) and ‘other’ indirect expendi-
tures (i.e., expenditures for travel, food, and any informal
payments, such as bribes or kickbacks). We report the
incidence of OOP payments and the median OOP pay-
ment per month.
Catastrophic healthcare expenditure (CHE)
We measured CHE and its impact on households/indivi-
duals using the technique and indicators adapted from
O’Donnell et al. [17]. We measured the incidence, inten-
sity, and distributional fairness (across income quintiles)
of CHE. We used household monthly income as a de-
nominator in calculating the CHE instead of the usually
recommended household consumption expenditure, or
non-food expenditure, because we did not have data on
the latter.
Headcount
Headcount is the percentage of households whose
monthly OOP expenditure, as fraction of monthly
household income, for outpatient care (for chronic con-
ditions) exceeded a particular threshold. Most com-
monly accepted and used threshold in literature has
been 10% at which households are usually forced to cut
down their subsistence needs [18]. We calculated the
headcount at four different thresholds i.e. 5%, 10%, 15%,
and 20% using the following formula,
Headcount ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
Ei
[17] where E is an indicator equal to one if Ti/Xi > z and
zero otherwise, Ti is the OOP expenditure by a house-
hold i, Xi is the income of a household i, z is the given
catastrophic threshold, and N is the sample size.
Overshoot
Headcount only suggests the percentage of households
that spent OOP beyond a particular threshold but does
not give an idea on how far (intensity) they spent beyond
the threshold. Overshoot measures the degree by which
an average OOP expenditure (in entire sample) crossed
the given catastrophic threshold. We measured the over-
shoot by using the following formula,
Overshoot ¼ 1
N
 XN
i¼1
Oi
[17] where the excess payment of household i is defined
as Oi = Ei((Ti/Xi) − z).Mean positive overshoot
Unlike the overshoot that uses all the households as de-
nominator, the Mean Positive Overshoot (MPO) uses only
those households that have actually experienced CHE as
the denominator. Hence MPO measures the degree by
which the average OOP expenditure by households that
have experienced catastrophe has exceeded the given cata-
strophic threshold. We measured the MPO by using the
following formula,
Mean positive overshoot MPOð Þ
¼ Overshoot=Headcount
[17]. Hence if household i experienced the CHE, it would
have spent (MPOi + z) percentage of the household in-
come on healthcare.
Concentration curve & index
Concentration curve and index help to understand the
distribution of CHE across the income quintiles. Con-
centration curve above the 45-degree line (line of equal-
ity) leads to negative value for concentration index and
suggests disproportionately higher concentration of ca-
tastrophe among the poor households and vice versa.
When the concentration index is zero, it suggests the
absence of the income-related inequalities in distribution
of CHE. Concentration index has been calculated using
the following formula,
Concentration index CIð Þ ¼ p1L2 p2L1ð Þ
þ p2L3 p3L2ð Þ
þ p3L4 p4L2ð Þ
þ p4L5 p5L4ð Þ
[17] where p is the cumulative percentage of households
ranked by their monthly income, L is the cumulative
percentage of households experiencing catastrophe for
the corresponding p. Numbers (1 to 5) suggest the rele-
vant income quintile.
The independent variables used in the study are
described below.
Chronic condition
There is no standard definition available for a chronic con-
dition. It is generally defined as an illness or impairment
that lasts for a long duration. The minimum time period
for an illness to be considered chronic varies depending
on the source of the definition: ranging from three months
to one year [19,20]. We considered the presence of a
chronic condition when any individual was taking medica-
tions on a daily basis for 30 days preceding the census.
Respondents usually reported cases where family members
were prescribed regular medication by a healthcare pro-
vider but were unable to take the medication for various
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chronic conditions.
Type of healthcare services – as place for consultation
The type of healthcare service was defined as either gov-
ernment or private, depending on the ownership of the
healthcare facility used by patient as the first contact
point where consultation happened. This does not ne-
cessarily mean that all of the healthcare was received at
this facility. For example, a person with diabetes who
contacts a government health centre for a consultation
might be asked to use a private laboratory for blood
sugar measurements and/or a private pharmacy for
medications if these services are not available at this
facility. This is, unfortunately, often the case. In this
example, we would define the government healthcare
service as being the place for consultation. The patient’s
healthcare expenditure, however, would include the
expenditures for services received from the government
health centre as well as those incurred for private
laboratory and pharmacy services.
Levels of healthcare services
We defined three levels of healthcare services, depend-
ing on where the person with a chronic condition was
being managed at the time of the census: i) clinics/health
centres; ii) referral hospitals with in-patient facilities;
and iii) super-specialty hospitals attached to the medical
schools. These three groups of facilities roughly corres-
pond to primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare ser-
vices, respectively. However, it is important to note that
in India, the levels of healthcare services are not very
distinct. In other words, there is poor gate keeping e.g.,
outpatient care for minor ailments and/or chronic con-
ditions is often provided by all three levels rather than
being limited to only clinics/health centres.
We used the per capita household income, household
size, and the type of ration card as other independent
variables. A ration card is a document issued to house-
holds by government authorities to enable access to es-
sential commodities at subsidised rates. It has also
become an important identity card for households’ offi-
cial poverty status (above or below the poverty line) to
access many welfare schemes.
We used STATAW 11 (StataCorp LP, Texas, USA) to
perform univariate and bivariate analyses. Associations
and comparisons between variables were assessed using
the chi-squared and Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Results
The overall response rate for the census was 98.5%
(Figure 1). The median age of the respondents was 35
years, and 75.1% of them were women. Of the 9,299
families surveyed, 3202 families (34.4%) reported havingone or more family member (total 3844 individuals) with
a chronic condition. Of those who reported presence of
chronic condition, 3029 families (94.6%) or 3782 indivi-
duals (98.4%) sought healthcare from healthcare facilities
at some point in time. Rest of them either did not seek
care or used self-medication. Table 1 provides the major
characteristics of the sample population.
OOP payments
We found that 69.6% (95%CI=68.0-71.2) of households
made OOP payments for outpatient care for chronic
conditions in the 30 days preceding the census. Overall,
68.1% (95%CI=66.6-69.5) of the chronic conditions led
to OOP payments. The incidence of OOP payments var-
ied according to the type and level of healthcare services
sought (Table 2). There was no statistically significant
difference in the incidence of OOP payments between
government (72.5%) and private (69.3%) sectors as a
place for consultation. The incidence of OOP payments
was greatest at the level of super-specialty hospitals, fol-
lowed by referral hospitals and clinics/health centres.
However, this difference was statistically significant only
when the government sector was used as a place for
consultation. The odds for incurring OOP payments was
2.6 times greater (95%CI=1.7-3.9) for ailments treated at
super-specialty government hospitals compared with
government health centres.
For the households that made OOP payments, the
monthly median OOP payment on outpatient care was
INR 400 (95%CI=380-403.5) (USD 8.1). The median
OOP payments on direct medical care was INR 360
(USD 7.3). Median OOP payments on the other items
(indirect expenditure) was zero, meaning 50% of house-
holds did not incur OOP payments on such items. The
median OOP payment per chronic condition was INR
320 (95%CI=300-350) (USD 6.5), with greatest share on
direct medical care.
The median monthly OOP payment per chronic con-
dition was significantly greater when private sector was
used as place for consultation (INR 415 or USD 8.4)
compared to the government sector (INR 280 or USD
5.7) (See Additional file 1). This finding was primarily
due to significantly greater OOP payments for direct
medical care when the private sector was used as place
for consultation rather than the government sector. Col-
lective OOP payments on other items, including travel,
food, and informal payments, were significantly greater
when the government sector was used as place for
consultation.
The OOP payments increased across the levels of
healthcare services when the government sector was
used as place for consultation. The median OOP pay-
ments made at health centres was significantly lower
compared to that made at the referral hospitals or the
Table 1 Major characteristics of the sample population
Households (n=9299)
Households that reported
chronic condition (n=3202)
Households that did not report
chronic condition (n=6097)
Income per month in INR - [Median (range)] Household Income 12000 (0, 205000) 9000 (14, 195000)
Per capita income 2500 (0, 60001) 2250 (2.8, 43333.3)
First quintile 1250 (0, 1583.3) 1200 (2.8, 1480)
Second quintile 1952.4 (1600, 2181.8) 1600 (1500, 1950)
Third quintile 2500 (2200, 2925) 2250 (2000, 2657.1)
Fourth quintile 3333.3 (3000, 3916.7) 3000 (2666.7, 3750)
Fifth quintile 5000 (4000, 60001) 5000 (3800, 43333.3)
Poverty status – as per the ration card [n (percentage)] Above the poverty
line
1972 (61.6) 2683 (44.3)
Below the poverty
line
242 (7.6) 725 (12.0)
No ration card 988 (30.9) 2643 (43.6)
Household size [mean (SD)] 5.2 (2.3) 4.6 (1.8)
Religion [n (percentage)] Islam 2178 (68.3) 3381 (64.2)
Hinduism 666 (20.9) 1468 (24.3)
Christianity 352 (11.0) 677 (11.2)
Others 2 (0.1) 17 (0.3)
Chronic Conditions (n=3902)
Type of the health services as place for consultation*[n
(percentage)]
Government 742 (19.6)
Private 3040 (80.1)
Levels of the health services[n (percentage)] Clinics/Health
centres
1621 (41.5)
Hospitals 1466 (37.6)
Super-specialty
hospitals
695 (17.78)
*Number of ailments treated in government and private sector does not add up to the total (i.e. 3902) because, for 120 ailment instances, individuals either used
self-medication or did not seek care.
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nificant when the private sector was used as place for
consultation.
Irrespective of the type and the level of healthcare
services used, households spent the greatest share of
OOP payments (66.3%) on the purchase of medications
(Figure 2). Apart from the expenditures on medications,
the laboratory investigations and the consultation fees of
doctors took the greatest shares of OOP payments at the
health centres/clinics and referral hospital levels. At the
super-specialty level, expenditures on travel to healthcare
facilities became the second largest expenditure. The
expenditures on travel were greater when the government
sector was used as place for consultation, especially at re-
ferral hospitals (20.6% of OOP payments) and at super-
specialty hospitals (16.4% of OOP payments), making it
the second major source of OOP payments at these levels.
Households spent a median of 3.2% (95%CI=3.0-3.4)
of their income on OOP payments for outpatient care
for chronic conditions. This share was greater when theprivate sector (3.3%) was used as place for consultation
compared with the government sector (2.4%). The differ-
ence was statistically insignificant.
OOP payments were regressive. The median share of
household income spent on OOP payments was signifi-
cantly higher among the lowest income quintile com-
pared with the highest income quintile (Table 2).
Catastrophic healthcare expenditures
The incidence and intensity of CHE across the income
groups are provided in Table 3. At any given threshold, the
incidence of financial catastrophe (i.e. the ‘Headcount’) was
the greatest among the poorest households and decreased
with an increase in income, except for the fourth quintile,
for which the headcount was slightly higher than that of
the third quintile. Concentration of financial catastrophe
among the poorest households was also evident form the
concentration curves being above the line of equality, and
the negative concentration indices for all the four cata-
strophic thresholds (See Additional file 2).
Table 2 Incidence and extent of OOP payments according to type and levels of healthcare services
Income
per capita
Incidence of OOP payments (Ailment as unit)* (95%CI) Median share
of household
income spent
as OOP (%)
Government**
(n=742)
Private**
(n=3040)
Government Private
Clinics/ Health
centres
(n=186)
Referral hospital
(n=171)
Super-specialty
hospital
(n=385)
Clinics/ Health
centres
(n=1435)
Referral hospital
(n=1295)
Super-specialty
hospital
(n=310)
1st quintile 56.9 (44.6, 69.3) 72.4 (55.1, 89.7) 77.8 (70.1, 85.4) 68.8 (63.2, 74.5) 69.2 (62.5, 76.0) 75.0 (64.4, 85.6) 4.0 5.9
2nd quintile 54.5 (39.2, 69.9) 78.9 (58.8, 99.1) 79.4 (69.6, 89.3) 61.5 (56.2, 66.9) 72.3 (66.3, 78.2) 78.6 (65.6, 91.5) 2.5 3.9
3rd quintile 60.7 (41.4, 80.0) 62.2 (45.8, 78.6) 81.3 (72.5, 90.0) 68.8 (63.6, 74.1) 66.5 (60.5, 72.6) 62.7 (50.0, 75.4) 2.4 2.9
4th quintile 81.8 (64.3, 99.3) 75.9 (59.3, 92.4) 86.4 (75.8, 96.9) 70.4 (64.2, 76.5) 70.3 (64.5, 76.1) 72.7 (60.6, 84.9) 2.0 3.1
5th quintile 76.6 (56.3, 96.1) 50.0 (36.2, 63.8) 79.9 (69.1, 90.2) 71.8 (66.6, 77.0) 73.8 (69.3, 78.2) 69.2 (58.8, 79.7) 1.3 2.4
*We used ailment as a unit of analysis instead of households. This is because individuals from a single household might seek care from different type (and levels)
of health services making it impossible to do segregated analysis as presented in this table. **Number of ailments treated in government and private sector does
not add up to the total (i.e. 3902) because, in 120 ailment instances, individuals either used self-medication or did not seek care.
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the ‘overshoot’) at a 10% threshold was 2.5% i.e., on an
average households spent 2.5% beyond the 10% cata-
strophic threshold. However, not all households actually
experienced financial catastrophe. Households that actu-
ally experienced catastrophe at the 10% threshold spent
an average of 15.6% beyond the threshold i.e., the ‘mean
positive overshoot’. Thus, these households spent an
average of 25.6% of their income on OOP payments i.e.,Figure 2 Composition of OOP payments according to the type and le
out-of-pocket payments for outpatient care for chronic conditions accordin
health centres, referral hospitals, super-specialty hospitals) of healthcare ser
the purchase of medications irrespective of the type and the level of healt
laboratory investigations and the consultation fees of doctors took the gre
hospital levels. At the super-specialty level, expenditures on travel to healththreshold + mean positive overshoot. The poorest
households suffered the greatest overshoot and the sec-
ond greatest mean positive overshoot: the greatest being
in the fourth quintile. The overshoot decreased with an
increase in the catastrophic threshold value, while the
reverse was observed for the mean positive overshoot
(Table 3).
Low household income, a ‘below the poverty line’ house-
hold status, the use of referral and/or super-specialtyvels of healthcare services. This figure depicts the composition of
g to the type (i.e., government, private) and the level (i.e., clinics/
vices. The greatest share of out-of-pocket payments (66.3%) was on
hcare services used. Apart from the expenditures on medications, the
atest shares of OOP payments at the health centres/clinics and referral
care facilities became the second largest expenditure.
Table 3 Incidence and intensity of CHE across the income groups
Income groups Measures of CHE Catastrophic threshold (share of household income) used to measure CHE
5% 10% 15% 20%
First quintile (Poorest) Headcount (%) (95%CI) 38.1 (34.2, 41.9) 23.1 (19.7, 26.4) 14.2 (11.4, 16.9) 11.0 (8.5, 13.4)
Overshoot (%) (95%CI) 6.7 (4.5, 8.9) 5.3 (3.2, 7.4) 4.4 (2.4, 6.5) 3.8 (1.8, 5.8)
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 17.6 22.9 31.0 34.5
Second quintile Headcount (%) (95%CI) 27.4 (23.9, 30.9) 13.8 (11.1, 16.6) 6.6 (4.6, 8.6) 4.7 (3.0, 6.3)
Overshoot (%) (95%CI) 2.3 (1.8, 2.9) 1.4 (0.9, 1.8) 0.9 (0.5, 1.3) 0.6 (0.3, 1.0)
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 8.4 10.1 13.6 12.8
Third quintile Headcount (%) (95%CI) 20.7 (17.5, 23.8) 10.2 (7.8, 12.5) 6.0 (4.2, 7.9) 4.1 (2.6, 5.7)
Overshoot (%) (95%CI) 2.1 (1.4, 2.7) 1.4 (0.8, 1.9) 1.0 (0.5, 1.5) 0.7 (0.3, 1.2)
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 10.1 13.7 16.7 17.1
Fourth quintile Headcount (%) (95%CI) 23.7 (20.0, 27.4) 11.6 (8.8, 14.4) 7.6 (5.3, 10.0) 4.9 (3.0, 6.8)
Overshoot (%) (95%CI) 5.6 (−5.7, 11.7) 4.7 (−1.4, 10.8) 4.3 (−1.8, 10.3) 4.0 (−2.1, 10.0)
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 23.6 40.5 56.6 81.6
Fifth quintile (Least poor) Headcount (%) (95%CI) 16.9 (14.2, 19.7) 8.2 (6.2, 10.2) 2.2 (1.1, 3.3) 0.3 (−0.1, 0.7)
Overshoot (%) (95%CI) 1.1 (0.6, 1.5) 0.5 (0.1, 0.9) 0.3 (−0.1, 0.7) 0.2 (−0.2, 0.6)
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 6.5 6.1 13.6 66.7
Overall Headcount (%) (95%CI) 27.5 (26.0, 29.1) 16.0 (14.8, 17.3) 10.1 (9.1, 11.2) 7.9 (6.9, 8.8)
Overshoot (%) (95%CI) 3.4 (2.3, 4.5) 2.5 (1.4, 3.6) 2.0 (0.9, 3.1) 1.7 (0.7, 2.8)
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 12.4 15.6 19.8 21.5
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(having four or fewer members) were associated with a
greater likelihood of incurring financial catastrophe at all
the catastrophic thresholds (Table 4).
Poverty-related measures
OOP payments for outpatient care pushed 0.9% of
people with chronic conditions below the poverty line in
KG Halli in a one-month period, nearly doubling the ab-
solute number of people living in poverty (Table 5).
The average extent by which individuals fell below the
poverty line (i.e., mean poverty gap) also increased from
INR 2.4 (USD 0.05) to INR 19.5 (USD 0.4) as a result of
OOP payments. OOP payments further deepened the pov-
erty by an average of INR 796.9 (USD 16.2) for those living
below the poverty line i.e., mean positive poverty gap.
To cope with OOP payments, households borrowed
money in 109 (4.2%) instances and occasionally sold
and/or mortgaged their assets (See Additional file 3).
Households from the lowest income quintile were sig-
nificantly more likely to borrow money (OR=6.3, 95%
CI=3-14.8) than the highest quintile. None of the house-
holds in the highest income quintile had to sell and/or
mortgage their assets.
Households were significantly more likely to cope
using their savings when the clinics/health centres were
used as place for consultation compared with the referral
hospitals and/or super-specialty hospitals (OR=1.6, 95%CI=1-2.5). Households using super-specialty hospitals as
place for consultation had 2.3 times greater odds (95%
CI=1.4-2.3) of borrowing money than the households
using clinics/health centres. No significant difference
was found in the use of coping mechanisms between the
government and private sector.
Discussion
OOP payments and resultant financial catastrophe
In KG Halli, 69.6% of the households made OOP pay-
ments for outpatient care for chronic conditions. As a
result, 16% of households suffered financial catastrophe
at a 10% threshold. There are no other Indian studies
with which to compare our findings. In fact, the inci-
dence of catastrophe in KG Halli, resulting only from
OOP payments for outpatient care for chronic condi-
tions, is much greater than the incidence of catastrophe
from OOP payments for overall healthcare (healthcare
for all types of ailments) in Karnataka (9.9%) and is com-
parable to that in India (15.4%) [9]. Mondal et al. [11]
revealed that in 2007, urban households in West Bengal
spent 4.2% of their annual household expenditure on
care for chronic conditions. This estimate is close to our
estimate from KG Halli (i.e., 3.2%). In fact, our estimate
is similar to that for the overall healthcare in urban
Karnataka (3.3%) for the year 2004–2005 [21].
Thus, residents of KG Halli incur high OOP expend-
iture for outpatient care for chronic conditions. We also
Table 4 Correlates of financial catastrophe among households
Independent variables* Odds ratio (95%CI) for incurring financial catastrophe at different thresholds
5% 10% 15% 20%
Poorest/first quintile 3.7 (2.8, 5) 3.7 (2.6, 5.3) 7.8 (4.5, 14.5) 47 (12.2, 397.2)
(Least poor/fifth quintile) p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05**
Below poverty line card holders 1.5 (1.1, 2) 1.9 (1.4, 2.6) 2.3 (1.6, 3.3) 2.7 (1.8, 4)
(Above poverty line card holders) p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05
Government sector*** 0.9 (0.7, 1.1) 1 (0.8, 1.3) 1.2 (0.9, 1.7) 1.4 (1, 2)
(Private sector) p=0.44 p=0.89 p=0.16 p=0.05
Super-specialty hospitals 1.9 (1.5, 2.4) 2.1 (1.6, 2.8) 2.3 (1.7, 3.2) 2.3 (1.6, 3.4)
(Clinics/Health centres) p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05
Referral hospitals 1.6 (1.3, 1.9) 1.5 (1.2, 1.9) 1.6 (1.7, 3.2) 1.5 (1.1, 2.1)
(Clinics/Health centres) p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05
Households with four or less members 1.5 (1.3, 1.8) 1.8 (1.5, 2.2) 2.2 (1.7, 2.8) 2.2 (1.7, 2.9)
(Households with more than four members) p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05
*Comparator is provided in the bracket. **Fisher exact p value. ***173 households whose members exhibited mixed health seeking behavior (i.e. using
government as well as private sector as place for consultation) were dropped from the analysis.
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dence of OOP payments and financial catastrophe be-
tween the government sector, which is expected to
provide free healthcare (or with nominal user fees), and
the private sector as place for consultation. This finding
seems to contrast with an earlier study that reported a
greater likelihood of incurring financial catastrophe by
households seeking healthcare from the private sector
[22]. There may be several reasons for this finding.
First, 66.3% of the OOP payments were for medica-
tions during outpatient care for chronic conditions in
KG Halli. High OOP spending on medications, even
when government sector was used as place for consult-
ation (66%), was likely due to the unavailability and/or
frequent out-of-stock status of essential medications in
the government sector. In KG Halli, where diabetes and
hypertension are the most reported chronic conditions,Table 5 Impact of OOP payments for outpatient care on pove
Measures of poverty Gross of OOP
payments (1)
Poverty headcount ratio (95%CI) 1% (0.7, 1.3)
Standard error 0.002
Mean Poverty gap (INR) (95%CI) 2.4 (1.48, 3.27)
Standard error 0.457
Normalised poverty gap (INR) (95%CI) 0.4% (0.246, 0.545)
Standard error 0.076
Mean positive poverty gap (INR) (95%CI) 242.4 (191.8, 293.1)
Standard error 24.963
Normalised mean positive poverty gap (95%CI) 40.4% (31.99, 48.87)
Standard error 4.163one of the two government facilities does not stock anti-
diabetic or anti-hypertensive medications, while they are
frequently out of stock in the other facility. The median
availability of generic medications, listed as the core
medications by the World Health Organisation, at gov-
ernment facilities was only 12.5% in Karnataka [23]. An-
other major component of OOP payments for chronic
conditions were expenses for laboratory investigations.
In KG Halli, blood sugar testing is not conducted at either
of the two government facilities. Thus, for medications
and testing, the patients using government facilities in KG
Halli as place for consultation must rely on private phar-
macies and laboratories in the area, which leads to high
OOP payments. Otherwise, patients must seek care from
referral government hospitals/super-specialty hospitals, in
which case they incur substantial travel expenditures. Our
estimates indicate that 90.8% of OOP payments in therty
Net of OOP
payments (2)
Difference
Absolute (3=2-1) Relative (3/1)*100
1.8% (1.4, 2.2) 0.9% 91.6%
0.002
19.5 (−5.26, 44.32) 17.2 724.1%
12.643
3.3% (−0.876, 7.390) 2.9% 724.6%
2.108
1039.3 (−289.3, 2367.9) 796.9 328.7%
666.160
173.3% (−48.24, 394.88) 132.9% 328.7%
111.090
Bhojani et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:990 Page 10 of 13
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/990government sector come from expenditures for medica-
tions, laboratory testing, and travel.
High OOP spending for medications has remained a
consistent feature in India and is not limited to chronic
conditions. Estimates from the consecutive Consumer
Expenditure Surveys (CESs) have revealed that in urban
India, the greatest share of OOP spending has been on
medications; 81.6% in 1993–94, 74.8% in 1999–2000,
and 71.2% in 2004–2005 [9,24]. Segregated estimates
available from the CES from the year 1999–2000 for
urban India further suggests that the share of OOP pay-
ments on medications (69.6%) was more for outpatient
care (56.3%) than inpatient care (13.3%) [24]. In general,
the trade liberalisation and reforms for pharmaceutical
policies (especially regarding price control) in the last
decade have been argued to be responsible for making
medications more expensive in India [9].
Second, there are user fees in government hospitals
with subsidies/exemptions for people with below the
poverty line ration cards. In KG Halli, only 10.5% of
households have the below the poverty line ration cards.
In fact, 39.2% of households in poor conditions do not
possess the ration card, a document often needed to ac-
cess subsidised healthcare. The remainder of households
possess above the poverty line ration cards. Therefore,
healthcare in government facilities is not entirely free for
most of the sample population.
Finally, in KG Halli, the provision for outpatient
care for chronic conditions is primarily by the private
sector (nearly 22 clinics and 4 hospitals). Many of the
private providers in KG Halli are informal providers
(less/not qualified) and are likely to charge lower fees
than qualified private providers. A study in Delhi slums
also revealed that households were less likely to incur
catastrophic expenditures when they sought care from
informal/unregistered private providers rather than gov-
ernment providers, although this association was not
statistically significant [25]. In essence, the government
sector when used as place for consultation fails to pro-
vide affordable care to people with chronic conditions in
KG Halli.
We found that the likelihood of incurring financial
catastrophe was significantly greater when referral and/
or super-specialty hospitals were used as place for con-
sultation rather than clinics/health centres. This finding
suggests that effective gate keeping with enhanced co-
ordination across the levels of healthcare services may
help to reduce financial catastrophe for patients with
chronic conditions. We could not find other studies
from India reporting the incidence of catastrophic
expenditures by the levels of healthcare services sought.
We found that households with four or fewer mem-
bers were more likely to incur financial catastrophe
than larger families. With 67% of the population in theproductive age of 15 to 60 years, it is reasonable to as-
sume that larger households would have more earning
members and more income, thereby making them less
likely to face financial catastrophe. Our finding corro-
borates similar association found in earlier studies
[11,25].
OOP spending is inequitably high among the poor
We found that in KG Halli, the incidence of financial ca-
tastrophe is higher among poor compared with rich and
that poor spends higher share of their income as OOP
payments. This is reverse in case of overall healthcare
(inpatient and outpatient) in Karnataka and at the India
level [9,24]. However, if we examine the studies provid-
ing segregated information on OOP payments for out-
patient care in urban India, the picture is different.
These studies reveal that incidence of financial catastro-
phe and the OOP spending (as share of income) was
higher among poor households [22,26]. A study from
West Bengal also revealed that although OOP payments
for inpatient care were progressive, they were regressive
for outpatient care [12].
These findings raise the question of whether the cata-
strophic payments are regressive in the case of outpatient
care, even when they appear to be progressive for health-
care on the whole. This is an important question, as
people with chronic conditions are more likely to spend
repeatedly and incur greater cumulative expenses for out-
patient care. The West Bengal study revealed that the
odds of incurring financial catastrophe was greatest for
outpatient care for chronic conditions, greater than that
for inpatient care at various catastrophic thresholds [11].
Apart from the incidence, even the intensity of CHE was
greatest among the poorest families in KG Halli. When
poor households spend a greater part of their income as
OOP payments, the absolute disposable income left with
these households would be very less compared to rich
households resulting in extreme financial distress.
OOP payments push people into poverty
In KG halli, OOP spending on outpatient care not only
pushed people into poverty but also deepened the poverty
they suffered. Berman and colleagues [10] revealed that in
2004, nearly 4.9% of Indians fell below the poverty line
due to OOP payments for outpatient care. In fact, the pro-
portion of Indians falling below the poverty line due to
OOP spending on healthcare has increased over the last
decade [9]. To cope with OOP payments, most house-
holds used their savings, but for some ailments, they had
to borrow money (3.4%) or even sell/mortgage their assets
(0.2%). The West Bengal study reported that 11.3% of
households borrowed money, while 0.5% of households
had to sell and/or mortgage their assets to cope with OOP
payments for outpatient care [12].
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conditions
Considering the rising burden of chronic conditions in
India and the fairly predictable need for long-term out-
patient care for such conditions, segregated data about
healthcare spending and its implications for outpatient
care would be very useful for health managers/planners.
Indrani Gupta [21], in her paper on poverty estimation
methods presented to the Planning Commission of India,
also suggests the need to account for the differences in
‘acute vs. chronic conditions’ and ‘hospitalisations vs. out-
patient care’ while measuring OOP payments and related
poverty measures.
Untreated chronic conditions
In our study, respondents reported cases where family
members were advised to use daily long-term medica-
tion but were unable to take it for various reasons. Such
cases amounted to 3.1% of all reported chronic condi-
tions. Analyses of the NSS from 2004 with regard to car-
diovascular diseases and diabetes revealed estimates of
untreated ailments similar to those of our study i.e., 4%
of cardiovascular and 3% of diabetes cases [27]. We did
not attempt to understand the reasons for the lack of
treatment, but it seems logical to assume that financial
constraints would be one of the primary reasons.
Selvaraj and Karan [8] report that financial constraints
have remained the second major reason for not seeking
healthcare in India for the last two decades, explaining
20% of non-treated ailments in urban India in 2004.
Study limitations
Our interest in studying the financing of outpatient care
for chronic conditions grew from our work in KG Halli,
where chronic conditions are highly prevalent and
people face difficulties in accessing healthcare services.
This limited focus should be remembered while consid-
ering our findings. In fact, the total OOP payments by
households for overall healthcare could be much greater,
and some of the associations we explored in this paper
would be affected by these additional OOP payments for
other ailments, including for inpatient care.
Our operational definition of chronic conditions used
in this study missed individuals with undiagnosed
chronic conditions. Studies in India have shown validity
of using self-reports of morbidity [28]. Furthermore, our
analysis focuses on healthcare expenditure and so a pos-
sible underestimation of illness prevalence would not
affect it. The use of household income instead of the
consumption expenditure (or non-food expenditure) for
the calculation of CHE may lead to the overestimation
of the household’s capacity to pay and an underestima-
tion of the true CHE incidence. Importantly, our
approach ignores households that chose to forgohealthcare and thus do not make OOP payments on
healthcare. In fact, such households are likely to suffer
from greater opportunity costs and the direct impact of
ill health. Although a long period (nine months) of data
collection would have probably overcome the seasonal
differences in healthcare spending, the cross-sectional
data could only provide the transient effect of OOP pay-
ments. We could not capture the long-term effects of
OOP payments on these families.
The way forward
It is clear from our study that OOP payments on out-
patient care for chronic conditions are causing significant
impoverishment among people in KG Halli. Consistent
with Samb and colleagues’ [2] argument, many of our
study findings make a case for strengthening the existing
healthcare system to improve access to quality care for
chronic conditions. Our findings have direct implications
for the resources for health systems (especially finances
and medical products) and the way healthcare services are
organised for delivering healthcare.
In the context of high OOP payments, it is important
to provide financial protection for the population,
thereby enabling people to access healthcare services. In
context of very limited financial protection provided by
government funded healthcare services in India, only ap-
proximately 25% of the population is covered by some
form of health insurance [29]. Most of this limited
coverage took place in the last few years, primarily
through government-initiated health insurance schemes,
and in particular, the Rastriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
(RSBY), a national health insurance scheme that now
covers approximately 100 million people living below
the poverty line or working in the informal labour
sector. However, except for a few federal government-
initiated social insurance schemes that cover approxi-
mately 5% of the Indian population, these schemes do
not cover outpatient care [29]. The Vajpayee Arogyasri, a
health insurance scheme recently launched in Bangalore
city that would cover residents of KG Halli, is also lim-
ited to inpatient surgical services [30].
Using the NSS data, Shahrawat and Rao [31] analysed
the impact of various OOP payment scenarios (no pay-
ment for medication, no payment for inpatient care, no
payment for outpatient care) on the incidence of cata-
strophic expenditures. They found that the maximum
reduction in the incidence of catastrophic expenditures
occurred when people did not have to pay for medica-
tions and/or outpatient care compared with a negligible
reduction from subsidising the inpatient care. We join
them in suggesting that schemes, such as RSBY, should
increase the depth of coverage (or benefit package) to in-
clude medications and the breadth of coverage to in-
clude vulnerable families not necessarily falling below
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payment-related impoverishment. The recent launch of
a pilot initiative to test the inclusion of limited out-
patient care (consultations and medications) in RSBY is
a welcome development [32].
On the health services front, improvements in the
availability of medications and diagnostics within the
underfunded government sector (especially at health
centres) and the control of the costs of such services in
the private sector are needed. In the pluralistic health-
care delivery system of KG Halli, the efforts made in the
frame of the UHARP to improve coordination across the
healthcare providers with an enhanced gate-keeping
function at the primary care level could reduce the un-
necessary financial burden on households and improve
the care for chronic conditions.
We only discuss the healthcare payments related im-
poverishment in this paper. It is important to consider
this in context of the adverse social determinants that
affect health and living conditions of urban poor com-
munities. Limited access to drinking water, sanitation fa-
cilities, and education adversely affect their health and
productively leading to deprivation [33]. Also, like in
many low- and middle-income countries, India exhibits
a ‘mixed health systems syndrome’ of low public finan-
cing, an unregulated private market, and poor govern-
ance in the health sector requiring reforms within and
outside of the health sector [34].Conclusions
Most households in KG Halli make OOP payments on
outpatient care for chronic conditions, be it in the pri-
vate or (underfunded) government sector. As a result,
some of these families suffer financial catastrophe and
slip into poverty. Most families use their savings to cope,
but some have to borrow money and/or sell their assets
to handle catastrophic OOP payments for healthcare.
There is a need to provide financial protection to fam-
ilies, especially those from the poorer sections of society,
to protect these families from the impoverishing effect
of OOP spending on healthcare. Existing government-
initiated health insurance schemes, such as RSBY, should
include outpatient care for chronic conditions. We also
suggest strengthening the existing healthcare services by
enhancing the gate-keeping function of the primary care
services and the availability of affordable medications
and diagnostics for common chronic conditions.Additional files
Additional file 1: Correlates of financial catastrophe among
households. Provides a table providing monthly OOP payments per
chronic condition according to type and level of healthcare services.Additional file 2: Concentration curves and indices. Depicts the
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